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The existing top-k aggregation algorithms mainly address
efficiency issues such as how to find top-k objects with the
least communication overhead. In the CDN example, if the
number of documents runs to millions, a naïve method by
which all data are transmitted to the central manager is
inefficient. As we discuss in Section II, various algorithms
have been developed to reduce the network communication
costs. However, there is one more important issue in
distributed top-k aggregation: the authentication issue.
In top-k aggregation, the multiple distributed databases can
be autonomously managed and sometimes outsourced. Also,
the data service provider (in short, DSP) which collects data
from the databases and calculates top-k results can also be an
independent party and can be outsourced for cost down. In
such distributed and outsourced environment, the DSP or
databases may be malicious or subverted by an adversary.
Even if just one among the DSP and the databases is
compromised, it could return tampered results, including: 1)
incomplete results, 2) altered ranking, and 3) spurious results.
If an attacker drops from the result some higher ranked objects,
the user receives incomplete information. By tampering with
the ranking order, the attacker can bias the results. In addition,
the attacker may add fake information to the result.
In this paper we investigate algorithms that authenticate topk aggregation results in distributed and outsourced databases.
However, we address not only authentication but also
efficiency. Our solution is based on a well-known top-k
aggregation algorithm: the Three Phase Uniform Threshold
(TPUT) algorithm [2]. We first develop an authenticated top-k
aggregation algorithm based on TPUT. We call this algorithm
A-TPUT. The main strength of A-TPUT is that 1) it provides
the authentication capability which is not supported in the
original TPUT algorithm and 2) it only requires a fixed
number of communication rounds between the DSP and the
databases regardless of the number of objects needed to find
top-k results.
To develop an authenticated version of TPUT, we delicately
integrate two authentication techniques. The first technique is
the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) which is a tree-based data
structure for detecting tampering over a series of values. With
MHT, we can guarantee the completeness and correctness of
data communicated between trusted parties and untrusted
parties. The second technique is the Condensed-RSA
algorithm [14]. Condensed-RSA is a digital signature
technique which is suitable for combining signatures
generated by a single signer into a single condensed signature.

Abstract—Top-k queries have attracted interest in many different
areas like network and system monitoring, information retrieval,
sensor networks, and so on. Since today many applications issue
top-k queries on distributed and outsourced databases,
authentication of top-k query results becomes more important.
This paper addresses the problem of authenticated top-k
aggregation queries (e.g. “find the k objects with the highest
aggregate values”) in a distributed system. We propose a new
algorithm, called Authenticated Three Phase Uniform Threshold
(A-TPUT), which provides not only efficient top-k aggregation
over distributed databases but also authentication on the top-k
results. We also introduce several enhancements for A-TPUT to
reduce both the computation cost and the communication cost.
Finally, we confirm the efficiency of our solutions through an
extensive experimental evaluation.
Keywords-component; Top-k,
Databases, Outsourced Databases

I.

Authentication,

Distributed

INTRODUCTION

The results of a top-k query are k objects that have the highest
overall scores. Top-k queries have attracted much interest in
many different areas like network and system monitoring [2],
information retrieval [5], sensor networks [12, 13] and so on.
The main reason for such interest is that they reduce the
overhead by pruning away uninteresting answers.
As network and ubiquitous environments are emerging, the
objects which are subjects of top-k queries are distributed
across nodes in the network. This means that the target of topk queries is no longer a centralized database but distributed
multiple databases. In such distributed environments, top-k
aggregation first aggregates the scores for each object which
resides in multiple distributed databases, and then, finds k
objects whose aggregated score (mostly the sum of scores
from distributed databases) is ranked within top-k. An
example of top-k aggregation is the top-k query processing
over a content distribution networks (CDN) for large
enterprises. Large enterprises have branch offices located
around the globe. The number of branch offices ranges from a
few tens to a few thousands. Due to the diverse geographical
locations of branch offices, the links between the offices may
have low bandwidth and long round trip time. Successful
operations of CDN rely on effective monitoring of the
activities on the network which means that the central
management station is often asked to answer “top-k” queries
like “list the top-k most popular documents across the whole
CDN”. In this example, the score associated with a document
is the number of downloads for the document.
978-0-7695-4848-7/12 $26.00 © 2012 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/SocialCom-PASSAT.2012.103
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We use this signature scheme to reduce the communication
cost between trust parties and untrusted parties. By using
Condensed-RSA, we can combine signatures of multiple
objects and send only one digital signature (instead of multiple
signatures) to reduce the communication cost.
Next, we develop an optimization technique for A-TPUT
with regard to the communication between the databases and
the DSP. Here, we reduce communication costs by increasing
the threshold which is used to determine how many objects
should be transmitted from the databases to the DSP. Higher
threshold means less data transmission. We provide formal
equations to find a higher threshold value, and then prove that
A-TPUT always finds the genuine top-k aggregation results
and correctly authenticates the results with the higher
threshold value.
Through extensive experiments, we first show that our
approach efficiently authenticates top-k aggregation. The
results show that our approach significantly reduces not only
communication costs but also response time compared to other
algorithms.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We develop authenticated top-k aggregation algorithms
(A-TPUT and S-TPUT) using MHT and Condensed-RSA
for distributed and outsourced databases. We also prove
that A-TPUT and S-TPUT correctly authenticate the top-k
results.
• We propose an optimization technique for A-TPUT and
S-TPUT. This technique reduces communication costs
between the databases and the DSP.
• With extensive experiments, we show the efficiency of
our authentication algorithms and optimization technique.

improves upon FA by using a threshold so as to stop at a
higher position than FA. The Best Position Algorithm (BPA)
[4] improves over TA by reducing the number of sorted
accesses and random accesses. However a major drawback of
BPA, as well as FA and TA, is that they require several
communication rounds which incur very high communication
costs especially when the number of databases is large.
Fagin et al. also suggested the No Random Access (NRA)
algorithm [1]. It uses a threshold mechanism like TA, but
unlike TA it does not require random accesses but only sorted
accesses. Mamoulis et al. proposed the Lattice-based Rank
Aggregation (LARA) in order to reduce the computational
cost of NRA [3]. LARA has a computational cost of O(2m)
where m is the number of databases as opposed to O(n)
required by NRA. When m is small, LARA is more efficient
than NRA. But, when m is large, it is not more efficient than
NRA.
The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2]
is an efficient algorithm to answer top-k queries in distributed
systems. The algorithm reduces communication costs by
pruning away ineligible data items and restricting the number
of round-trip messages between the DSP and databases.
However, TPUT does not provide any authentication
mechanisms.
Yu et.al. proposed the Three Phase Adaptive Threshold
algorithm (TPAT), the Three Phase Object Ranking based
algorithm (TPOR), and the Hybrid-Threshold algorithm (HT)
[16]. TPAT generalizes TPUT by utilizing summary statistics
of the data. However, it could be very expensive to use
summary statistics to accurately estimate data distributions. In
TPOR, each database should send all data up to the last
temporary top-k objects in phase 2. Therefore, TPOR performs
worse than TPUT in the case when object rankings widely
vary across all nodes. HT is proposed to combine the
advantages of both TPUT and TPOR. Neumann et.al.
suggested Adaptive Thresholds [17]. It is similar to TPAT, but
does not require summary statistics. On the other hand, since
the problem is NP-hard, it gives approximations based on a
heuristic. In this paper, we give the exact solution and provide
better optimization of TPUT than them.
Authentication for the top-k results: Verifying the
completeness and authenticity of range and top-k queries
results computed by untrusted third parties has also received
much attention. Existing methods [6,7,8,13] for range query
result verification fall in two categories. The first category
includes methods that use the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [7,8].
The method by Li et al. [7] uses the more efficient Embedded
Merkle B-tree (EMB-tree) structure. Such method indexes the
data with a B+-tree and then embeds an MHT into it. The
second category includes methods based on signature-chaining
schemes [6,13]. Assuming that a database is ordered according
to an attribute the data owner hashes and signs every triple of
consecutive data tuples. Li et al. [7] have shown however that
signature-chaining approaches incur very high index
construction cost, storage overhead, and user-side verification
time.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses related work on existing top-k aggregation
algorithms and authentication for the top-k results. Section III
presents our system model and attack model, and then briefly
describes a basic top-k aggregation algorithm (i.e., TPUT)
which is the basis for our approach. Section IV proposes our
authenticated top-k aggregation algorithms (A-TPUT and STPUT). Section V presents an optimization technique to
reduce the amount of data transmission for aggregating top-k
results. Section VI reports the experimental results. Section
VII summarizes and concludes the paper.
II.

RELATED WORK

Work related to our approach falls into two categories: (i) topk aggregation algorithms and (ii) authentication for the top-k
results.
Top-k aggregation algorithms: Efficient processing of top-k
queries in distributed environments has received much
attention [1,2,3,4,9]. A first important algorithm is Fagin’s
Algorithm (FA) [9] which models the general problem of
answering top-k aggregation queries using distributed lists of
data items sorted by their values. It first performs a sorted
access to all lists and finds at least k data items retrieved in all
lists. Then, it executes a random access to all the retrieved data
items to guarantee that the values of the other items are less
than the top-k values. The Threshold Algorithm (TA) [1]
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Approaches for the authentication of top-k results have been
proposed by Nath et al. [11] and Zhang et al. [12]. The former
approach uses one-way chains and RSA for the authentication
of the MAX aggregate functions and for top-k queries. The
latter approach focuses on top-k query results authentication in
two-tier sensor networks with the goal of reducing the
communication overhead. However both these approaches
only handles the situation where all the data items are unique.
It means that every two nodes have disjoint sets of data items
and there is no support for aggregation. By contrast, our ATPUT allows that different databases have the same objects by
considering the aggregate value for the object.
Pang and Mouratidis have proposed the Threshold with
Random Access (TRA) algorithm and Threshold with No
Random Access (TNRA) algorithm for authenticated top-k
queries [5]. These algorithms are based on TA and NRA,
respectively. However, since TA and NRA require an
unpredictable number of rounds, TRA and TNRA are not
suitable for distributed environments. By contrast, our ATPUT algorithm only requires three rounds.
III.

autonomously managed by different authorities. The databases
can be compromised or the data stored by database can be
tampered with. Therefore, we assume that the databases
cannot be trusted. The role of databases is to provide (parts of)
the lists and authentication information to the DSP on behalf
of the data owners.
The data service provider (DSP): The DSP accepts top-k
queries from users and returns the results to users. A top-k
query is forwarded to the databases associated with the
different data owners and the DSP computes the result based
on the data obtained from the databases. The query result for
Q returned to the user, R, is an ordered list of k entries, R =
∀1 ≤  ≤  ,
[<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,…,<Ok,Vk>], in which
R.Oj∈D is a result data item and R.Vj∈ ℝ is its corresponding
aggregate value. We assume that the DSP also can be
compromised and the top-k results can be tampered with since
the DSP can be outsourced.
The users: A user issues a query Q specifying a value for
parameter k and receives the result R from the DSP. The user
needs to verify the top-k result R is correct in cases in which
the databases and the DSP cannot be trusted.
A correct query result R should relate to the query Q and the
data collection D as follows: The aggregate value of an object
O is V(O)=∑ . where m is the number of databases in
the distributed system. The query result R is correct if and only
if it satisfies the following conditions:
• The result entries are ordered according to non-increasing
aggregated values, i.e., ∀1 ≤  ≤  ≤ , R.Vj≥R.Vl.
•
All the objects that are excluded from R have lower
aggregate values than the last entry in R, i.e., for any nonresult object O ∈D, it holds that V(O) ≤R.Vk.

PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we first introduce our system model and the
attack model. Then, we briefly discuss an unauthenticated topk aggregation algorithm, TPUT, which is basis of our
approaches.
A. System Model
We consider distributed environments for top-k query
processing and authentication of the top-k results. In such
distributed environments, our system model involves four
parties: (i) the multiple data owners who provide data
collection, (ii) the distributed databases which store a set of
data, (iii) the data service provider (DSP) which processes topk aggregation by communicating with the databases, and (iv)
the users who issue top-k queries and receive the results from
the DSP. In our system model, we assume that the databases
and the DSP are not trusted since they can be outsourced.
Figure 1 illustrates the four parties and data flows among them.
The data owners: Data owner DOi manages a data collection
D comprising n objects: D = {O1,O2,…,On}, n≥1. For example,
objects can be web pages in a web server, inventory items, or
people. Each object O is bound to a value V which is the
measure for deciding top-k results. For example, the value can
be the number of accesses for each web page, the number of
inventory items, or the salary of an individual. To compute a
top-k aggregation, the data owner DOi provides a sorted list Li
defined as Li = [<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,…,<On,Vn>] such that: (a)
∀1 ≤  ≤ , Li.Oj is an object in D and Li.Vj indicates the
value bound to Oj; and (b) ∀1 ≤  ≤  ≤ , Li.Vj≥Li .Vl. The
data owner DOi also manages authentication information
which we will discuss in the next sections. For simplicity, we
assume that all the data owners have the same data collection
(but different values may be bound to the same object by
different data owners).
The databases: Each data owner transfers its own list and
authentication information to its associated database for query
outsourcing. The databases are distributed in the network and

Figure 1. The System Model for Top-K Aggregation

B. Attack Model
As described in Section III.A, among the entities in our system
model, the DSP and the databases are the potential adversaries
as they could be subverted by attackers. The attacks can
happen both in the databases and in the DSP as follows:
• In the databases, the adversaries may alter the lists. This
means that values associated with objects may be altered
or some objects and values may be omitted.
• In the DSP, the adversaries may execute the top-k
aggregation query processing algorithm incorrectly or
tamper with the results. This means that the order (i.e.,
ranking) of the top-k may be changed or some top-k
results may be omitted.
Example 1: Assume that a top-3 query is given and assume
that the correct result is [<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,<O3,V3>] where
V1>V2>V3. Now assume that a malicious DSP changes V2 to V2’
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two objects O1 and O4 which are not retrieved in phase 2 are
eliminated and S = {O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7}.
In phase 3, the DSP sends S to all databases. The databases
respond and the DSP concludes that the top-2 objects are O5
and O0 and the values are 2.33 and 1.95. Finally, they are
returned to the user. ∎

so thatV1>V3>V2’. In this case, even if the user still gets the
correct set of top-k objects, the ordering of these objects in the
result is not correct. In addition, a malicious DSP may drop
the record <O3,V3> from the result and add a record <O4,V4>
where V3>V4. In this case, the user gets an incomplete result
[<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,<O4,V4>].∎
The goal of this paper is to protect top-k results against such
attacks. To achieve this goal, we will allow the users (i) to
verify the correctness of the query results and (ii) to check the
completeness of the results.

TABLE I.
Position

C. The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) Algorithm
The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2] is
an efficient top-k aggregation algorithm but it does not provide
any authentication mechanism. We will use TPUT as the basis
of our authenticated top-k aggregation algorithm since it is
simple and has desirable features for distributed top-k
aggregation such as a fixed number of communication rounds
between the DSP and the databases.
The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2]
consists of three phases, each taking one round of
communication:
• Phase 1: it establishes a lower bound on the true bottom.
The DSP informs all databases that it would like to start
computing a top-k query. Each database sends the top-k
objects from its list. After receiving the data from all
databases, the DSP calculates the partial sums of the
values of the objects. Then, it looks at the k highest partial
sums and takes the k-th one as the lower bound, denoted
as t1 and called “phase 1 bottom”.
• Phase 2: it prunes away ineligible objects. The DSP sets a
threshold T = t1/m and sends it to all databases. Each
database sends back the list of objects whose values are
greater or equal to T. The DSP then performs two tasks.
First, it calculates partial sums for the objects. Let’s call
the k-th highest sum “phase 2 bottom” denoted by t2.
Clearly, t1≤t2. Then, it tries to prune away more objects by
calculating the upper bounds of the objects. The objects
whose upper bounds are less than t2 are eliminated. The
set of remaining objects is the candidate set S.
• Phase 3: it identifies the top-k objects. The DSP sends the
set S to all databases and each database sends back the
values of the objects in S. The DSP calculates the exact
sum of the objects in S and selects the top-k objects.

AN EXAMPLE DATA SET WITH THREE LISTS
List L1
List L2
List L3

1

<O2,0.97>

<O5,0.97>

<O5,0.92>

2

<O6,0.89>

<O0,0.80>

<O0,0.79>

3

<O7,0.45>

<O3,0.70>

<O3,0.72>

4

<O5,0.44>

<O7,0.65>

<O7,0.64>

5

<O0,0.36>

<O2,0.52>

<O6,0.29>

6

<O1,0.28>

<O4,0.22>

<O2,0.28>

7

<O3,0.19>

<O1,0.12>

<O1,0.24>

8

<O4,0.13>

<O6,0.01>

<O4,0.01>

IV.

AUTHENTICATED TOP-K AGGREGATION

In this section, we introduce two mechanisms for supporting
authentication in TPUT. The technical challenges for
authentication are two folds: (1) to allow users to verify the
completeness and the correctness of the top-k results and (2) to
minimize data transmissions between the databases and the
DSP. For addressing the former issue, we first introduce the
Skewed Merkle Hash Tree (S-MHT), and then, for addressing
the latter issue, we develop a mechanism to reduce data
transmission that uses S-MHT and Condensed-RSA [14]
together.
A. Authenticated TPUT (A-TPUT)
Our algorithm is based on TPUT extended by the use of the
Skewed Merkle Hash Tree (S-MHT). Merkle Hash Tree is a
data structure to prove completeness and correctness of a
series of values by detecting tampering over the values.
Therefore it is suitable for authenticating top-k query results.
In the TPUT algorithm, we observe that the entries in the lists
in the databases are sorted and accessed from the front. This
means that to calculate top-k results with TPUT, we only need
a partial list which begins from the first entry of the list. Based
on this observation, we modify the original MHT structure to
skew the tree from left to right (i.e., construct the tree structure
from the first entries to the last entries) as shown in Figure 2.
Our S-MHT scheme works as follows. We compute a hash
chain over the records in the list. We include the digest of each
record in the digest computation of the record immediately
ahead of it. Finally, the digest of the first record is signed by
the private key of the data owner. This signature can be used
to verify any j leading records of the list. The details are as
follows.
Let n be the number of records in a list Li.
Digesti,n = h(Oi,n | Vi,n)
Digesti,j = h(Oi,j | Vi,j | Digesti,j+1), 1 ≤ j ≤ n-1
Signaturei= Signski(digesti,1)
These digests and the signature are computed by each trusted
data owner and sent to the corresponding database. When a
database i sends data up to position j, it sends the j-th digest
and the signature of the data owner as well as the data. When

Example 2: Consider the lists in Table I. A top-2 query is
given. In phase 1, all databases send the data at positions 1 and
2 to the DSP. The DSP calculates the partial sums: V(O2) =
0.97, V(O5) = 1.89, V(O6) = 0.89, and V(O0) = 1.59. The two
highest partial sums are 1.89 and 1.59 and the phase-1 bottom
t1 is 1.59. Then, the threshold T is set to 1.59/3 = 0.53.
In phase 2, database 1 does not send any data since it already
sent the objects whose values are greater than T in phase 1 and
databases 2 and 3 send data up to position 4. The DSP
determines the phase-2 bottom as t2 = 1.59 since V(O5) = 1.89
and V(O0) = 1.59 are the top-2 sums. Since the upper bounds
of all objects which are retrieved are greater than 1.59, only
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the DSP or the users receives them, they can verify that the
data sent from the database i was not tampered.

Proof (sketch). We prove the theoremfor all integer x∈[1,n]: x
is determined as the threshold and the remaining objects in
phase 3. If the user accepts a sequence from the database i in
A-TPUT, then conditioned upon the top-(x-1) values being
correct, Vx must be the value of the object Ox with the x-th
largest value. Trivially top-1 value is proved to be correct by
Digesti,1 and Signaturei. Obviously, the theorem can be
trivially proved via an induction on x.
Let the object with the x-th largest value be object Ox and let
its value be Vx. Let Ox’ and Vx’ be the corresponding answers
returned by the DSP. They may be forged. We prove by
contradiction. Assume that Vx’≠Vx. The user must successfully
verify Digestx’ for Vx’. But, when the user checks whether
=
1,
since
Digest1’=
Verifypk(Digest1’,Signature)
h(…h(Ox’|Vx’| Digestx+1)) is different from Digest1, the
verification fails.
On the other hand, an adversary may drop an object at the
bottom of the sequence. The smallest value in the sequence
should be less or equal to the local top-k value and the
threshold by the definition of A-TPUT. In addition, the
sequence should contain the top-k objects and the upper
bounds of all remaining objects should be greater or equal to
the smallest top-k value. When the adversary drops an object,
these conditions may not be satisfied. If these conditions are
not satisfied, it means that the result was forged or an object
was dropped.∎
Compared to the existing authenticated top-k aggregation
algorithms in outsourced databases, TRA and TNRA [5], in
our algorithm, the databases may send more data than TNRA.
However the response time of A-TPUT is much less than TRA
and TNRA since our algorithm has the strength on the fixed
number of data communication rounds in distributed
environments. TRA and TNRA are based on TA and NRA [1]
and the latency of TRA and TNRA is unpredictable because
the number of rounds varies by data input. The response time
consists of several round trip times. Each round trip time
contains transmission time, propagation delay, and
computation time at the DSP. In distributed environments, the
propagation delay is usually much longer than the
transmission time. For example, when the distance is 1000km,
the bandwidth is 100Mbps, and we send a packet of size
100Bytes, then, the propagation delay is about 4ms and the
transmission time is 0.008ms. Even if databases send k records
every round as TPUT, the propagation delay is much longer
than the transmission time. Moreover, TA and NRA has much
more rounds than TPUT. As the number of rounds increases,
the response time increases. So, for distributed databases,
TRA and TNRA are not desirable. We will show the
advantage of our algorithm in the experimental section.

Figure 2. Skewed Merkle Hash Tree

We now introduce how to use S-MHT to develop A-TPUT.
A-TPUT has three phases like TPUT. Only the phase 3 is
modified for authentication.
• Phase 1: All databases send the top-k objects to the DSP
and the DSP compute the phase-1 bottom t1 (same to the
original TPUT).
• Phase 2: The DSP sends the threshold T = t1/m to all
databases and the databases send the objects having
values greater or equal than T. Then, the DSP computes
the phase-2 bottom t2 and prunes away objects whose
upper bounds are less than t2. The remaining objects are
included in set S (same to the original TPUT).
• Phase 3: The DSP sends S to all databases and each
database sends the sequence containing the objects
corresponding to set S. In addition, for authentication,
each database sends its signature and a digest
corresponding to the last object which is located in the
lowest position in the sequence.
Figure 3 formally illustrates the algorithm for A-TPUT with
S-MHT. Phase 1 is step 1, phase 2 is from step 2 to 5, and
phase 3 is from step 6 to 7.
Algorithm A-TPUT with S-MHT
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases;
2. Compute a threshold T=t1/m where t1 is phase-1 bottom;
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T to all databases;
4. Compute phase-2 bottom t2;
5. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2;
6. Request each sequence containing remaining objects, a digest, and a
signature from each database;
7. Report each sequence, each digest, and each signature for each database
to the user;
Figure 3. A-TPUT (with S-MHT) algorithm

Example 3: To illustrate the algorithm, consider the lists in
Table 1. The first two phases of A-TPUT are the same as in
TPUT. However, in phase 3, since S ={O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7},
the database 1 should send a sequence containing objects up to
position 7, Digest1,7, and the signature. The database 2 has to
send a sequence containing objects up to position 8, Digest2,8,
and the signature. Finally the database 3 should transmit a
sequence containing objects up to position 6, Digest3,6, and the
signature. When the DSP receives the sequences from the
databases, it forwards them to the user that can then verify the
top-k result.∎
The following theorem establishes the correctness of
algorithm A-TPUT with S-MHT (i.e., the algorithm
authenticates top-k results.)
Theorem 1. A-TPUT correctly authenticates the top-k objects.

B. Signature-based TPUT (S-TPUT)
One weak point of A-TPUT is the number of data entries
which have to be transmitted from databases to DSP. This
number depends on the threshold T in phase 2 and the set of
remaining data S in phase 3. Here, we focus on the set S of
phase 3. We will focus on T in Section V.
We note that in A-TPUT the amount of data transmission
does not depend on the number of objects in S but depends on
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the lowest rank in S. In our basic S-MHT based algorithm,
even though the number of remaining objects in S is small, if
the rank of an object in S is low, the databases should send a
lot of data to the DSP. This is because we should send the
partial list which begins from the first entry to the entry which
has the lowest rank in S to authenticate the results (especially,
completeness). This means that we cannot omit any entry
between the first entry and the least ranked entry.
So, in this subsection, we exploit a signature-based
technique to address this problem (i.e., allowing us to omit
useless entries in the list). In our approach, data owners
additionally sign each tuple using Condensed-RSA [14]. The
Condensed-RSA scheme is a simple extension of the standard
RSA scheme. One of the well-known features of RSA is its
multiplicative homomorphic property. This property makes
RSA suitable for combining signatures generated on each data
item in a set by a single signer into a single condensed
signature. Having successfully verified a condensed signature,
a user can be assured that each data covered by the condensed
signature was signed by the data owner.
Standard-RSA: A data owner has a public key pk = (n’, e)
and a secret key sk = (d), where n’ is a k’-bit modulus
computed as the product of two random k’/2-bit primes p and
∗
q. The respective public and secret exponents  ,  ę 
satisfy  į 1 mod ∅(′) where ∅(′) = ( − 1)( − 1). An
RSA signature is computed over the hash of the input message.
Let ℎ() denote a suitable cryptographic hash function such
as MD5 or SHA-1 which produces a fixed-length output h(*)
upon a variable-length input m’. A standard RSA signature on
message m* is computed as:  = ℎ(∗ ) (mod Ą ) . RSA
signature verification involves checking that  ! ≡
ℎ(∗ ) # ′.
Condensed-RSA: Given j input messages {m1,…,mj} and
their corresponding signatures {s1,…,sj}, a Condensed-RSA
signature is given by the product of the individual signatures:
$, = %

&

$& (mod ′)

The resulting signature s1,j has the same size as a standard
RSA signature. When verifying a condensed signature, the
verifier needs to multiply the hashes of all input data and
check that:
($, )! ≡ %

&

ℎ(& ) (mod ′)

Now we will explain S-TPUT algorithm. In phase 3, when
the DSP requests data corresponding to remaining objects,
each database computes a Condensed-RSA signature from the
signatures of data corresponding to the remaining objects.
Then, each database sends the data, the digest corresponding
to the last object in phase 2, the signature of S-MHT and the
Condensed-RSA signature to the DSP.
So, when a user receives the data, the digest, the signature
of S-MHT and the Condensed-RSA signature for each
database, it knows which objects are remaining objects whose
upper bounds are greater than the smallest top-k value. Then,
by using the Condensed-RSA signature the user can verify
whether the data corresponding to remaining objects are
forged or dropped.
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Figure 4 shows the S-TPUT algorithm. Compared to
algorithm in Figure 3,
Steps 1 to 5 are same but the
remaining parts include the use of Condensed-RSA. In step 6,
we can see that it requests a set of only data corresponding to
remaining objects instead of a sequence containing remaining
objects.
By using S-TPUT, we can reduce the communication
overhead between databases and DSP. But, since each record
need a signature, the databases have more storage overhead.
However, we assume that since there are big storages
nowadays, the storage overhead is not a significant problem.
In addition, since S-TPUT exploits the Condensed-RSA
signature, the databases have more computation overhead than
A-TPUT. But, the computation times overlap with disk I/O
time at the databases, and S-TPUT needs only a small number
of signatures of records when compared to all records to be
sent. So, S-TPUT has much less computation time than ASBtree which needs the signatures for all records [7]. In [7], one
I/O operation time for random access is 15ms and the cost of
one modular multiplication with 128Byte modulus for the
Condensed-RSA signature is 100s.
Algorithm S-TPUT
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases;
2. Compute a threshold T=t1/m where t1 is phase 1 bottom;
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T to all databases;
4. Compute phase 2 bottom t2;
5. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2;
6. Request data corresponding to the remaining objects;
7. Each database compute its Condensed-RSA signature from the
signatures corresponding to the remaining objects
8. Report the data, each digest, each signature of S-MHT, and each
Condensed-RSA signature for each database to the user;
Figure 4. S-TPUT algorithm

Example 4: In phase 3 of A-TPUT, since S =
{O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7}, the database 1 should send data up to
position 7, Digest1,7, and the signature of S-MHT. The
database 2 has to send data up to position 8, Digest2,8, and the
signature of S-MHT. Finally the database 3 should transmit
data up to position 6, Digest3,6, and the signature of S-MHT.
However, in phase 3 of S-TPUT, the database 1 does not
need to send <O1,0.28> since O1 is not in S. Instead, it
computes a Condensed-RSA signature CS1 = SO7 ∙ SO5∙ SO0∙ SO3
and sends O7, O5, O0, and O3 with the aggregate signature CS1,
the digest, and the signature of S-MHT. The database 2 does
not need to send O4 and O1. It sends O2 and O6 with its
Condensed-RSA signature CS2. The database 3 sends O6 and
O2 with its Condensed-RSA signature CS3. So, S-TPUT sends
3 records less than A-TPUT in this example. Finally, when the
user receives the data and the Condensed-RSA signatures, it
multiplies the hashes of the data from each database
corresponding to the remaining objects and it checks whether
the product is equal to each Condensed-RSA signature.∎
Theorem 2. S-TPUT correctly authenticates the top-k objects.
Proof (sketch). By Theorem 1, a sequence in phase 2 satisfies
correctness and the completeness since each database should
send data whose values are greater or equal to the threshold.
Suppose that there are x remaining objects in phase 3. An
adversary succeeds in breaking Condensed-RSA if it produces
a valid aggregated signature for the remaining objects which

the assumption is not true, we will recalculate T’ later in ITPUT algorithm.
Next, the DSP requests the databases to send data whose
values are greater than or equal to T’. When the DSP receives
data whose values are greater than or equal to T’ in phase 2, it
should check that the k-th largest value is greater than or equal
to m*T’ to see whether the assumption we used to calculate T’
is true or not:
1) If the k-th largest value is greater than or equal to m*T’, it
means that the assumption is true (i.e., the objects which are
not reported so far do not have values greater or equal to
m*T’). Therefore, we can safely use T’ ( < T) as the threshold
and do not need to receive additional data from databases.
2) On the other hand, if the k-th largest value is less than
m*T’, it means that the assumption is false and we need to set
a new threshold value T* = t2/m. Since t2 is the k-th largest
value in phase 2, it is greater than or equal to t1. Therefore, T ≤
T* ≤ T’ and this means that the threshold is still greater than or
equal to the original TPUT. Now, the DSP requests the
databases to send additional data whose values are greater than
T*.
Figure 5 shows the I-PUT algorithm in detail.

passes verification. There are two cases. First, the adversary
can forge the value of an object. Second, it can drop an object.
First, suppose that the adversary changes the value Vx to Vx’
for the object Ox. However, since it does not know the data
owner’s private key, it cannot generate valid individual
signature Sx’ for the forged value Vx’. Hence, it cannot
generate valid Condensed-RSA signature to pass the
verification. Thus,($,' )! ≠ ∏'& ℎ( & | & ′) (mod ) . Second,
the adversary may drop an object. In that case, by Theorem 1,
the user knows which objects are remaining objects in phase 3.
So, if the adversary drops an object, it is detected by the user.
Therefore, S-TPUT correctly authenticates the top-k objects.∎
V.

OPTIMIZATION

In this section, we present an optimization technique for ATPUT and S-TPUT. Optimization can be done between the
databases and the DSP. We focus on minimizing the amount
of data transmission.
A. Optimization between Databases and DSP
Even though A-TPUT and S-TPUT are efficient algorithms in
that it reduces the communication cost by pruning away
ineligible data items, it can be inefficient especially in the case
where the threshold T is too small. In A-TPUT and S-TPUT,
the threshold is set to T = t1/m where t1 is the phase 1 bottom
and m is the number of databases. If T is small, the databases
should send large parts of their data to the DSP. This results in
a large amount of data transmissions between databases and
DSP which makes A-TPUT and S-TPUT inefficient.
In this section, we introduce an approach, called Improved
TPUT (I-TPUT), to decrease the communication overhead of
A-TPUT and S-TPUT by increasing the threshold T. We
observe that data about an object are not sent from all
databases in phase 1. This means that the local top-k objects
are usually not exactly same in all databases. We can use this
observation to replace t1 by t1’ which is greater than t1.
Consequently, we can use T’ = t1’/m instead of T. This
increases the threshold in phase 1 since T’ > T and then
decreases communication cost between databases and DSPs.
We calculate T’ as follows. When the DSP receives the topk objects from the databases, it computes the global objects
and their aggregate values. In addition, for the object having
the k-th largest value, it counts how many databases have sent
the object. The counter for object Ok is denoted by Ck. For

Algorithm I-TPUT
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases;
2. Compute a threshold T’=(t1+(m-Ck)*T)/m where t1 is phase 1 bottom;
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T’ to all databases;
4. Compute phase 2 bottom t2;
5. Check whether the smallest top-k value is greater than or equal to m*T’;
6. If so, go to the step 9;
7. Otherwise, Request objects whose values ≥ T* (=t2/m) to all databases;
8. Compute phase 2 bottom t2;
9. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2;
10. Request data corresponding to the remaining objects;
Figure 5. I-TPUT algorithm

Example 6: Suppose that there are three databases and top-1
query is given. If (O1, 0.6), (O1, 0.6), (O2, 0.7) are received
from three databases in phase 1, then, T = (0.6+0.6)/3 = 0.4.
But, in I-TPUT, T’ = (1.2 + (3-2)*0.4)/3 = 0.53. So, by using T’
instead of T, we can reduce the communication overhead. In
phase 2, when the DSP receives data whose values are greater
than or equal to 0.53, it should check whether the smallest topk value is greater or equal to 1.59(=0.53*3). If so, the
algorithm can terminate. Otherwise, the DSP should receive
data whose values are greater or equal to T* like the original
TPUT. ∎
Performance Analysis of I-TPUT. By using a threshold T’
greater than T, I-TPUT reduces the communication overhead
corresponding to part A in Figure 6. Since I-TPUT has higher
threshold than A-TPUT, it sends less data than A-TPUT. The
data which is not needed to be sent is shown part A. However,
since I-TPUT may have more remaining objects than A-TPUT
in phase 3, it may result in a higher communication overhead
corresponding part B. If I-TPUT has more remaining objects
than A-TPUT, its lowest position of the remaining objects is
lower than A-TPUT. But, usually part A is much greater than
part B. So, I-TPUT has much less communication overhead
than A-TPUT.
The communication overhead of A-TPUT is  ∗  ∗
(1.0 − -) + ∑
6  ∗ 6 ∗ (- − 7 6 ) where LOi is the smallest

instance, when Ck is equal to j (1jm), it means that the
object Ok was received from j databases and (m – j) databases
did not send the object Ok in phase 1.
First, we assume that the values of the object Ok in the
unreported databases are greater than or equal to T and make a
new threshold as follows according to the assumption:
-  = (/ + ( − 23 ) ∗ -)/
If the data values among databases are correlated 1 , the
assumption is true with high probability. For the case where
1

This kind of data correlation is common in real-world
applications[10].
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value for the remaining objects in list Li and pi is the
list Li. The
probability that LOi is less than T in
communication overhead of I-TPUT is  ∗  ∗ (1.0 − -′) +


∑
6  ∗ 6 ∗ (-′ − 7 6 ) . Thus, the difference between ATPUT and I-TPUT is  ∗  ∗ (-  − -) + ∑
6  ∗ 6 ∗ (- −


7 6 ) − ∑

∗

∗
(-′
−
7
)
.
In
correlated
databases which
6
6
6
have similar sets of top-k objects, usually p and p’ are equal to
0. Thus, the difference is  ∗  ∗ (-  − -) where T’>T.
Therefore, I-TPUT has much less communication overhead
than the original A-TPUT.

•

Our default settings for different experimental parameters are
shown in Table II. In our tests, the number of databases, i,e, m,
is a varying parameter. The default number of databases is 128.
The default number of data items in each database is 10,000.
Typically, users are interested in a small number of top
answers, thus unless specified we set k=100. Like many
previous approaches to top-k query processing [2], we use a
scoring function that computes the sum of the local values. In
addition, the default number of correlation parameter ¢ is
0.01.

Figure 6. Performance Comparison of A-TPUT and I-TPUT

We note that I-TPUT can be used in S-TPUT as well as ATPUT since I-TPUT is only involved in phase 1.
VI.

we generate the values of the data items in each list in
such a way that they follow the Zipf law. The Zipf law
states that the value of an item in a ranked list is inversely
proportional to its rank (position). Such distribution is
commonly observed in many kinds of phenomena, e.g. the
frequency of words in a corpus of natural language
utterances.
Uniform distribution (CU-Data): The second set of
correlated databases was generated as follows. For the
first list, we randomly generate a number for an object Oj.
The values follow the uniform distribution. Let p1,j be the
number. Then for each list Li (2≤i≤m) we generate a
random number r in interval [-α,… ,α] and we set pi,j to
p1,j +r. By controlling the value of α, we create databases
with stronger or weaker correlations.

TABLE II.
Parameter
# of databases (m)
# of records (n)
k in top-k
Correlation parameter α

EXPERIMENTS

A. Setup
We implemented the following algorithms in : A-TPUT, STPUT, AI-TPUT, and SI-TPUT. To better assess our
algorithms we also implemented two existing algorithms:
• Naïve: The databases send all data to the DSP and the
DSP forwards to the user all data received from the
databases.
• TNRA: NRA based authenticated top-k aggregation
algorithm proposed in [5]. TRA also provides
authentication for top-k aggregation, but we compare our
algorithms to only TNRA since [5] shows that TRA has
worse performance than TNRA.

EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
Values
32,64,128,256,512
2500,5000,10000,20000,40000
25,50,100,150,200
0.001,0.005,0.01,0.05,0.1

To evaluate the performance of the algorithms, we measure
the following metrics: communication overhead between
databases and DSP, and response time taken to get the
authenticated top-k results from the databases. Concerning the
communication overhead it is important to notice that even
though the number of remaining objects at phase 3 is small, if
the position of the last top-k object is low, in A-TPUT
databases would typically send a lot of data to the DSP. By
measuring the number of records transmitted by A-TPUT and
S-TPUT, we can verify that S-TPUT is more efficient than ATPUT.
On the other hand, when the threshold is very small in ATPUT or S-TPUT, each database should send a lot of data to
the DSP. By measuring the communication overhead of AITPUT and SI-TPUT, we can verify that AI-TPUT and SITPUT are more efficient than A-TPUT and S-TPUT. AITPUT and SI-TPUT uses I-TPUT technique of section V.A.
Response time is a time that an algorithm executes for
finding the top-k data items. TNRA requires several rounds.
By contrast our algorithms only require three rounds. In
distributed environments, a round trip time is much longer
than a transmission time. So, TNRA has much longer response
time than ours. We compare our algorithm to only TNRA
since TRA has much larger communication overhead than
TNRA [5].
For the experiments in Sections VI.B – VI.D, we use the
synthetic data sets for the experiments since we can fine tune

We tested them over correlated synthetic data sets.
Correlated sets are data sets in which the values of the data
in the lists are correlated. In real-world applications, such
correlations are common [10]. In our experiments, we generate
two sets of correlated data. Inspired from [10,4], we use a
correlation parameter α (0≤α≤1). We use two kinds of
synthetics as follows:
• Zipf law (CZ-Data): The first set of correlated databases
was generated as follows. For the first list, we randomly
select the position of data items. Let p1 be the position of
a data item in the first list, then for each list Li (2≤i≤m) we
generate a random number r in the interval [1 .. n*α]
where n is the number of data items, and we insert the
data item in the list at a position p such that its distance
from p1 is r. If p is occupied previously by another data
item, we insert the data item at the free position closest to
p. After setting the positions of all data items in all lists,
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characteristics of data. We omit the experiment for real data
due to space constraint.

AI-TPUT and SI-TPUT incur about 40% less communication
overhead than A-TPUT and S-TPUT. This is due to the fact
that when the threshold is small in A-TPUT or S-TPUT, the
databases have to send a lot of data to the DSP since the
values are uniformly distributed. But, in AI-TPUT or SI-TPUT,
by increasing the threshold using our I-TPUT algorithm, we
can reduce the communication overhead compared to A-TPUT
and S-TPUT.
The results in Figure 8(c) show that, when k is 25, A-TPUT
and S-TPUT have more communication overhead than the
other cases in which k is greater than 25. When the values are
uniformly distributed, if k is too small, we cannot find the
proper threshold. As k increases, we can get the better
threshold.

B. Communication Cost of S-TPUT
In this experiment, we compare the communication overhead
of our algorithms with that of naïve approach to show the
effect of the S-TPUT and the I-TPUT optimization (i.e., higher
threshold values). In this subsection, we evaluate the
efficiency of S-TPUT, whereas in next subsection we evaluate
that of I-TPUT. The communication cost metric is the number
of records transmitted from the databases to the DSP. The
result with CZ-Data is shown in Figure 7 and the result with
CU-Data is shown in Figure 8. From the results, we can see
that the efficiency of our proposed algorithm is largely
depends on the data distribution but our algorithm overwhelms
the existing algorithms in most cases.
In Figure 7 we can see that with CZ-data, S-TPUT incurs
about 100 times less communication overhead than A-TPUT.
This is due to that, in phase-3, S-TPUT receives only the data
corresponding to the set S of the remaining objects instead of
the sequences containing all of the objects in S as with ATPUT. When the number of remaining objects S in phase 3
becomes small, the advantage of S-TPUT becomes large. In
addition, when the position of the last objects becomes low,
the communication cost of A-TPUT becomes large.
The experiments in Figure 8 show that, unlike with CZ-Data,
S-TPUT has a similar communication overhead with CU-Data
compared to A-TPUT. With CZ-Data, S-TPUT has a small
number of remaining objects in phase 3 compared to A-TPUT.
But, with CU-Data, S-TPUT has a small threshold and there
are a lot of data, whose values are greater than the threshold,
to be sent in phase 2. On the other hand, with CZ-Data, even if
S-TPUT has a small threshold, there are no a lot of data whose
values are greater than the threshold in phase 2 since the
values follow the Zipf law.
For example, let’s assume that the threshold is 0.1. Since
the values are between 0 and 1, with CZ-Data, a database
sends only 10 records in phase 2 to DSP since the values
follow the Zipf law. But, with CU-Data, the database should
send about 90% of records since the values follow uniform
distribution. Therefore, S-TPUT is efficient with CZ-Data, but
it is not with CU-Data.

D. Comparing S-TPUT with TNRA
In this experiment, we compare our S-TPUT with the existing
authenticated top-k aggregation algorithm, TNRA [5]. We
measure the response time for the DSP to receive all data for
top-k from databases. As we described in Section V, counting
the number of transmitted records is not feasible to compare
the response time since TNRA has unpredictable number of
round trips and the round trip rime is much longer than the
transmission time. But our approach only requires a fixed
number of rounds. This feature significantly reduced actual
response time since in distributed environments the round trip
time is much higher than the packet transmission time. The
round trip time is proportional to the distance between a
database and a DSP. We assume that the round trip time is
10ms and the processing time is trivial. For TNRA, the
database sends k (=100) records every round.
In Figures 9, we can see that, in all experimental instances,
S-TPUT has a constant response time, whereas TNRA has a
response time much greater than S-TPUT. As the parameters
like the number of databases, k in top-k, the number of records,
and correlation ratio α increase in TNRA, the response time
increases. The results show that S-TPUT is the most suitable
algorithm for a distributed environment. Thus, S-TPUT has
much lower response time than TNRA.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the work for authenticated top-k
aggregation in distributed and outsourced databases. Our aim
is to enable the users to detect whether the top-k results
contain the correct results and to give efficient algorithms to
compute the top-k results with less communication overhead
and lower response time. Our algorithms are based on the
Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm which
gives top-k but does not have an authentication mechanism. To
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first authentication
mechanism based on TPUT which is efficient in distributed
environments. First, we propose A-TPUT having
authentication mechanism based on TPUT. Second, we
suggest S-TPUT and I-TPUT to improve A-TPUT. In addition,
we experimentally evaluate our techniques and demonstrate
their robustness and practicality.

C. Communication Cost of I-TPUT
From the experiments in Figure 7, we can see that I-TPUT is
not much efficient for CZ-data. This is due to that, in the Zipf
law, the value of an item in a ranked list is inversely
proportional to its rank. Since the value is between 0 and 1, the
value in the first rank is 1, the value in the second rank is 0.5,
and the value in the j-th rank is 1/j. So, for example, when
k=100, a database sends records whose values are greater than
0.01 in phase 1 by the Zipf law since it sends local top-100
records in phase 1. If the threshold of S-TPUT is greater than
0.01, SI-TPUT is not much efficient since even if SI-TPUT
has a higher threshold than S-TPUT, it already sent records
whose values are greater than 0.01 in phase 1.
In contrast, in Figure 8, with CU-Data, we can see that ITPUT is much efficient compared to A-TPUT and S-TPUT.
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(a) communication cost by m

(b) communication cost by n
(c) communication cost by k
Figure 7. Correlated Data following the Zipf law

(d) communication cost by α

(a) communication cost by m

(b) communication cost by n
(c) communication cost by k
Figure 8. Correlated Data following Uniform distribution

(d) communication cost by α

(a) Response time by m

(b) Response time by n
(c) Response time by k
Figure 9. TNRA vs S-TPUT

(d) Response time by α
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